

# DUNNO

## ABC Primary CA - HSM Key Protection Migration

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# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. Purpose

This document provides instructions for the migration of the ABC Primary CA's private key protection from HSM OCS protection to HSM 'module only' protection.

## 1.2. Scope

This document presents technical instructions for the following:

- Migrating the CA's private key protection to *module only*
- Erasure of the *now redundant* OCS

## 1.3. Applicability and Circumstances

This procedure is applicable to the following systems:

- *Virtual server console* used to connect to *Mascara server guests*
- Primary nShield Connect HSM in the *primary datacentre*
- Secondary nShield Connect HSM in the *primary datacentre*
- Virtual server guest hosting the ABC Class 2 Primary CA

This procedure is NOT applicable to any other system.

## 1.4. Role Abbreviations

Below is a list of the role abbreviations used in this document:

- Key Ceremony Director [KCD]
- CA Administrator [CAO]
- Key Component Holder [KCH]

## 1.5. Reading Note

The screenshots contained in this document are intended to represent an example of the screen you should expect to see at a particular point in the procedure. The text accompanying the screenshot is the authoritative instruction to follow and should be the only source of information for configuring the system.

Where reference is made to opening a "PowerShell prompt as administrator" – this means in the context of User Access Control (UAC). Where reference is made to executing a PowerShell script, it is implied that the qualified path is specified, i.e. ". \" precedes the script name to be executed.

## 2. Prior to Key Migration

### 2.1. Copy Diagnostics File

#### Begin Procedure – Performed at the Class 2 Primary CA Guest

01. [CAO]

**DMW: This entire section could be eliminated if we know the PowerShell script is present**

Verify if the following file exists (using Windows Explorer)

- D:\Commissioning\HSM\03.HSM-Diagnostics.ps1

If the file exists, go straight to Section 2.2

02. [CAO]

Insert the USB memory stick containing the following file:

- 03.HSM-Diagnostics.ps1

03. [CAO]

Copy the file into the following location on the Class 2 Primary CA Server:

- D:\Commissioning\HSM

#### End Procedure

### 2.2. Backup Key Management Data

#### Begin Procedure – Performed at the Class 2 Primary CA Guest

01. [CAO]

Open the **Certification Authority** MMC snap-in

Stop the **Active Directory Certificate Services** service

02. [CAO]

Remove and secure (temporarily) the OCS cards in the primary and secondary network HSMs

03. [CAO]

Start Windows Explorer and create the following folder:

- D:\Emergency-Recovery-Material\PKIData\nCipher\YYYY-MM-DD

*Note: YYYY-MM-DD is the reference date for when this operation is being performed*

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### 04. [CAO]

Copy the contents of following folder:

- D:\PKIData\nCipher\Key Management Data

Into the following folder:

- D:\Emergency-Recovery-Material\PKIData\nCipher\YYYY-MM-DD

*Note: If prompted to provide Administrator permission, click the **Continue** button*

**End Procedure**

### 2.3. Confirm OCS Key Protection in Use

#### Begin Procedure – Performed at the Class 2 Primary CA Guest

##### 01. [CAO]

Start a PowerShell session (as Administrator) and change directory to:

- D:\Commissioning\HSM

Run the command shown below:

- rocs

##### 02. [CAO]

Run the command shown below:

- list keys

Verify the command output is as shown below:

No.	Name	App	Protected by
1	ABC Class 2 Prima	caping	PROD-CCA-OCS-1

##### 03. [CAO]

Run the commands shown below:

- set changeprot
- module 1

##### 04. [CAO]

Run the command shown below:

- list cardsets

Verify the command output is as shown below:

No.	Name	Keys (recov)	Sharing
	module	0 (0)	---
1	PROD-CCA-OCS-1	1 (1)	1 of 2; persistent

#### End Procedure

### 3. Perform Key Migration

#### 3.1. Perform the Key Protection Migration

##### Begin Procedure – Performed at the Class 2 Primary CA Guest

01. [CAO]

In the PowerShell session, run the command shown below:

- `target module`

02. [CAO]

Run the command shown below:

- `mark 1`

03. [CAO]

Run the command shown below:

- `recover`

04. [KCH]

**The actions in this section must be performed at the primary network HSM in the datacentre. A quorum of ACS card holders are required to insert their ACS cards into the network HSM and enter the relevant pass phrase at the console used to initiate the command**

Insert the first ACS card into the network HSM

Verify the command output is *similar* to shown below (the names and card numbers may vary):

```
Authorising OCS replacement:  
Module 1: 0 cards of 1 read  
Module 1 slot 0: empty  
Module 1 slot 0: Admin Card #1  
Module 1 slot 0:- passphrase supplied - reading card  
Card reading complete.
```

05. [CAO]

Run the command shown below:

- `save`

06. [KCH]

Remove the last ACS card from the HSM

##### End Procedure

### 3.2. Validate Migration

#### Begin Procedure – Performed at the Class 2 Primary CA Guest

##### 01. [CAO]

In the PowerShell session, run the command shown below:

- `list keys`

Verify the command output is as shown below:

No.	Name	App	Protected by
1	ABC Class 2 Prima	caping	module

##### 02. [CAO]

Run the command shown below:

- `exit`

#### End Procedure

## 4. Post Key Migration

### 4.1. Start ADCS and Publish a Fresh CRL

**Begin Procedure – Performed at the Class 2 Primary CA Guest**

01. [CAO]

Open the **Certification Authority** MMC snap-in

Start the **Active Directory Certificate Services** service

02. [CAO]

In the **Certification Authority** MMC snap-in:

Select the **Revoked Certificates** container

Choose **All Tasks | Publish** from the context menu

Click **OK** when prompted (it may take up to sixty seconds)

03. [CAO]

Start Windows Explorer and select the following folder:

- D:\PKIData\IDP

Validate that the time stamp on the following file reflects the *current time*:

- ABC Class 2 Primary CA.crl

**End Procedure**

## 4.2. Generate Diagnostic Output

### Begin Procedure – Performed at the Class 2 Primary CA Guest

01. [CAO]

In the PowerShell prompt run the following command:

- `03.HSM-Diagnostics.ps1`

In the log file that is automatically opened in Notepad, verify both Module 1 and Module 2 return no errors - see Appendix B for indicative diagnostic output

### End Procedure

## 4.3. Erase Redundant OCS Cards

### Begin Procedure – Performed at the Class 2 Primary CA Guest

01. [CAO]

KCH inserts their OCS card into the network HSM

02. [CAO]

In the PowerShell prompt, run the following command:

- `createocs --module 1 -erase`

Press the Enter key when prompted

03. [KCH]

When the command has completed, KCH removes the OCS card

04. [KCH]

Repeat the first three steps for the entire set of OCS cards

### End Procedure

## 4.4. Purge Redundant OCS Files from the File System

**Begin Procedure – Performed at the Class 2 Primary CA Guest**

01. [CAO]

Start Windows Explorer and change to the following folder:

- D:\PKIData\nCipher\Key Management Data\local

02. [CAO]

Delete all files prefixed with either of the following two names:

- card
- cards

**End Procedure**

## 4.5. Change ADCS to Start Automatically

**Begin Procedure – Performed at the Class 2 Primary CA Guest**

01. [CAO]

Open the Services MMC snap-in

02. [CAO]

Change the start-up type for Active Directory Certificate Services to:

- Automatic (Delayed Start)

**End Procedure**

## 4.6. Restart the Server and Publish a Fresh CRL

### Begin Procedure – Performed at the Class 2 Primary CA Guest

01. [CAO]

Restart the server

02. [CAO]

Open the **Certification Authority** MMC snap-in and confirm that ADCS is started

Select the **Revoked Certificates** container

Choose **All Tasks | Publish** from the context menu

Click **OK** when prompted (it may take up to sixty seconds)

03. [CAO]

Start Windows Explorer and select the following folder:

- D:\PKIData\IDP

Validate that the time stamp on the following file reflects the *current time*:

- ABC Class 2 Primary CA.crl

### End Procedure

## Appendices

### Appendix A: Bring Along Items

The following items are required to perform the procedure described in this document:

- A quorum of **ABC Class 2 PKI** ACS cards
- The complete set of **PROD-CCA-OCS-1** OCS cards (for erasure)
- The `03.HSM-Diagnostics.ps1` commissioning file on a USB stick

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## Appendix B: Diagnostic Output

```
enquiry
Server:
enquiry reply flags none
enquiry reply level Six
serial number 6D05-0BE0-D947 2C05-0250-D947
mode operational
version 2.103.13
speed index 956
rec. queue 218..366
level one flags Hardware HasTokens
version string 2.103.13cam19, 3.3pla21 Built on Feb 2 2017 10:10:03, Bootloader:
1.1.28, Security Processor: 2.1.18 , 3.63.3cam1, 3.3pla21 Built on Feb 2 2017 10:10:03,
Bootloader: 1.1.28, Security Processor: 2.1.18 , 3.63.3cam1
checked in 00000000487debd5 Wed Jul 16 12:38:45 2008
level two flags none
max. write size 8192
level three flags KeyStorage
level four flags OrderlyClearUnit HasRTC HasNVRAM HasNSOPermsCmd ServerHasPollCmds
FastPollSlotList HasSEE HasKLF HasShareACL HasFeatureEnable HasFileOp HasLongJobs
ServerHasLongJobs AESModuleKeys NTokenCmds JobFragmentation LongJobsPreferred Type2Smartcard
ServerHasCreateClient HasInitialiseUnitEx Type3Smartcard HasKLF2
module type code 0
product name nFast server
device name
EnquirySix version 4
impath kx groups
feature ctrl flags none
features enabled none
version serial 0
remote server port 9004
```

```
Module #1:
enquiry reply flags none
enquiry reply level Six
serial number 6D45-02E0-D937
mode operational
version 3.3.21
speed index 478
rec. queue 22..50
level one flags Hardware HasTokens
version string 3.3pla21 Built on Feb 2 2017 10:10:03, Bootloader: 1.1.28, Security
Processor: 2.1.18 , 3.63.3cam1
checked in 0000000058934bca Thu Feb 02 15:10:02 2017
level two flags none
max. write size 8192
level three flags KeyStorage
level four flags OrderlyClearUnit HasRTC HasNVRAM HasNSOPermsCmd ServerHasPollCmds
FastPollSlotList HasSEE HasKLF HasShareACL HasFeatureEnable HasFileOp HasLongJobs
ServerHasLongJobs AESModuleKeys NTokenCmds JobFragmentation LongJobsPreferred Type2Smartcard
ServerHasCreateClient HasInitialiseUnitEx Type3Smartcard HasKLF2
module type code 12
product name nC3025E/nC4035E/nC4035N
device name Rtl
EnquirySix version 6
impath kx groups DHPrime1024 DHPrime3072
feature ctrl flags LongTerm
features enabled StandardKM HSMBaseSpeed LoadObjBaseCap
version serial 36
connection status OK
connection info esn = 6D05-02E0-D747; addr = INET/173.16.29.3/9004; ku hash =
94af7a7dc042681586e908719ce273f96f34116a, mech = Any; time-limit = 24h; data-limit = 8MB
image version 12.42.14cam3
max exported modules 3
rec. LongJobs queue 21
SEE machine type PowerPCELF
supported KML types DSAP1024s160 DSAP3072s256
using impath kx grp DHPrime3072
hardware status OK
```

```
Module #2:
enquiry reply flags none
```



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```
shareno      0
shares
error        OK
No Cardset
```

```
Module #1 Slot #1 IC 0
generation    1
phystype     SoftToken
slotlistflags 0x0
state        0x2 Empty
flags        0x0
shareno      0
shares
error        OK
No Cardset
```

```
Module #2
generation    2
state        0x2 Usable
flags        0x0 !ShareTarget
n_slots      2
esn          2C05-02E0-D947
hkml         455c14c743bfc1ecb97bff377775ef7c6d71cd70
```

```
Module #2 Slot #0 IC 0
generation    1
phystype     SmartCard
slotlistflags 0x2 SupportsAuthentication
state        0x2 Empty
flags        0x0
shareno      0
shares
error        OK
No Cardset
```

```
Module #2 Slot #1 IC 0
generation    1
phystype     SoftToken
slotlistflags 0x0
state        0x2 Empty
flags        0x0
shareno      0
shares
error        OK
No Cardset
```

No Pre-Loaded Objects

```
=====
nfmverify
```

```
** [Security world] **
  Ciphersuite: D1f3072s256mRijndael
  128-bit security level
  2 Administrator Card(s)
  (NOT IN ANY SLOT of an attached module)
  HKNSO 72adaa197a4d0e92c9f40e1c11c5541759ae5c28
  Cardset recovery ENABLED
  Passphrase recovery disabled
  Strict FIPS 140-2 level 3 (does not improve security) disabled
  SEE application non-volatile storage ENABLED
  real time clock setting ENABLED
  SEE debugging ENABLED
  SEE debugging restricted
  Foreign Token Open authorization disabled
  Generating module ESN 6D05-02E0-D947 currently #1 (in same incarnation)
```

Verification successful, confirm details above. 0 keys verified.

```
=====
nfmcheck
nfmcheck: information: Module #1 Slot #0 Empty
nfmcheck: information: Module #2 Slot #0 Empty
nfmcheck: everything seems to be in order
```